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" LAOKOON" AND THE PRIOR QUESTION
The first gift of criticism is perspective. By perspective
I mean a comprehensive view of related matters shown in their
just and intelligible proportion. To attain such views in any
department which falls within our human ken is no light task.
The matters considered must be seen, as Arnold would have us
see life, steadily and whole; and steadiness implies balance in the
observer, no less than wholeness depends upon the accessibility
of the phenomena. It is a happy union, therefore, of the personality and the season which produces the truly great critic.
The source and fountain of European criticism, Aristotle's
Poetics, appears just after the greatness of Greek literature had
run its course, when Greek epic and drama lay before the observer
with all the completeness which was to be preserved to posterity.
Longinus On the Sublime-if we are to assume the probable date
-follows the entire flowering of the pagan classics. Lessing's
Laokoon, publIshed in 1766, is contemporary with the rococo
decadence of the new classicism which came into being with the
Renaissance. Each of these treatises is something in the nature
of an obituary disquisition, for each is concerned with the portrayal of excellences which, at least in the form that is foremost
in the critic's mind, are not to appear in the literary expression
of the ensuing age-excellences which are in a bodily sense dead
and buried, and if at all subject to resurrection only so in some
decidedly novel incarnation. It is partly for this reason, I fancy,
that the panegyric temper of Longinus so movingly affects us.
And is it not fairly obvious also that the recency of the
development considered, as of a bereavement not yet clearly
realised, unconsciously disturbs the critical office? I would not
say that in the case of such minds as those of Aristotle and
Longinus and Lessing the criticism is warped by its circumstances-that is too strong an expression; but it does not seem
unfair to affirm that each of these critics writes with a local and
circumstantial bias which modifies the final value of his perspective. Aristotle clearly gives us no standard for judgment of
Greek poetry as a whole (which, doubtless, he never intended to
give); his interest is centralised in the public, the agonistic, types
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of composition-in the dithyramb, in the epic, in tragedy,-and
consequently his criticism elevates the dramatic elements in
literature and judges merits by dramatic effects: ~6oc; rather than
4'u(J'tc;, man rather than nature, becomes for him the proper
theme of literary art,-though perhaps we had better say that the
poems which went under the title IIcpl <Pu(J'cwc;, even when they
attained to such epical imaginings as appear in the works of Empedocles, seemed to him to involve no proper artistic problem; for
with Aristotle as with Plato the problem of art is a problem of
ethics, and the poems on nature were to be tried before the
metaphysical tribunal of truth rather than subjected to the
resthetico ethical adjudication of xaAoX&ra6ta.
Longinus clearly has more feeling for nature (in an resthetical
sense) than has Aristotle. But Longinus, no less than Aristotle,
has partialities which constitute a bias. For if Aristotle is a
spectator, Longinus is a listener: it is the oration which is foremost in his imagination, and he hears all poetry as from the
mouth of a declaimer. And in nature what he most admires is a
certain cosmic magniloquence, of thunder and flame and of the
moving sea, susceptible of imitation in the high speech of mortal
men. The world of nature is after all but a setting for the works
of man, and if these are now to be celebrated from the rostrum
rather than upon the stage the change is but one of the manner,
not of the matter of the art.
Said in all fairness, Aristotle),nd Longinus give us the best
measure of ancient criticism; they define for us the classic conception of literature, as essentially human and essentially dramatic. I do not mean to say that no other forms appear in
antiquity; I have already cited the poems on nature; and many
minor modes, lyric, meditative, passively descriptive, find their
due examples. But were we to excerpt from classical literature
the elements neglected by Aristotle and Longinus we should have
taken away little that is of more than antiquarian interest; the
vital body would still remain.
It is worth while to get clearly in mind this essential classicisD;l
before turning to Lessing, for the feeling for what is human and
dramatic is the very pillar of Lessing's criticism. Viewing
ancient literature at a distance, he could see it in truer perspective; and he had besides the advantage of comparison with later
literary developments. Further, Lessing had seen the rise of
that consciousness of the separateness of art from the run of
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htm1an interests which has given us the domain. of resthetics as a
distinct domain; so that where the ancients saw only a problem
of the good we can see a problem of beauty, and by comparing
art with art-a task which they never seriously attempted-we
can analyse beauty from diverse situations. We should expect,
then, that Lessing, having the equipped mind and having the
materials before him, when he undertakes his discussion of the
"boundaries of the arts," would give us a more capable and
satisfying depiction of the office of literature than even the
greatest of his antique predecessors. We should expect him to be
free from the adventitious and circumstantial, in so far as this
may be allowed to man; and perhaps the highest tribute that
could be paid to Lessing's value is the fact that a capable editor,
a hundred and fifty years after the Laokoon first appeared,t in
giving us an edition "purged of the ephemeral" finds so little of
what was printed on the original page to be excluded from the
modem.
In Lessing, we may reasonably assume, classicism finds its
central expositor. And in undertaking a review of the works of
some contemporary critics, whose conflicts largely turn upon
their conceptions of "classic" and its assumed antithetical,
"romantic," we may best serve our purpose by a restatement of
the main thesis of Lessing's work,-all the more in point from the
fact that a notable modem book by Professor Irving Babbitt
challenges the comparison in its title, The New Laokoon.
I

It is the genius of the German to generate an atmosphere of
profundity about the simplest ideas. Most Teutonic thinkers
are men of one idea, but that idea is so patiently dichotomised
and so ingeniously elaborated that it ends by becoming a system;
for them experience is confounded with logistic and metaphysics
identified with Schematismus. It is doubtless for this reason
that the German philosophers are of all men the easiest to
epithet; a word or a phrase will carry the whole burden of their
thought, whose formidable outward show is only the gaseous
enlargement of its ponderable substance.
Lessing is a German. I do not mean that he lacks matter;
but compare him with Aristotle or Longinus and he reads thin;
Z
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it is, after all, the garb of learning with which he invests his idea,
rather than its own native richness, that makes its impressiveness.
I speak of "his idea" in the singular, for he shares the peculiarity
of his countrymen, and the Laokoon is very obviously a book of
one thought. Indeed, he himself reduces it to an epigram: "Die
Zeitfolge ist das Gebiet des Dichters, sowie der Raum das Gebiet des
Malers"-"Temporal succession is the province of the poet, as
space is that of the painter." The whole essay is but an elaboration of this conception: time is the "pure form" of poetry, space
is the "pure form" of pictorial art.
I cannot strictly call this Kantianism, though the application
of Kant's Transcendental }!Esthetic to the problems of art must
have produced exactly this conclusion; for while Lessing had
some personal acquaintance with Kant, the Laokoon antedates
the Kritik by some fifteen years, and indeed is contemporary
with Kant's first puzzling over inner and outer space. But the
analogy is none the less interesting, showing as it does how
inevitably the Teuton of the period solved his empirical problems
by transcendental reason-so explaining in advance, what any
reader of Lessing must feel, that his illustrations are chosen by
his thesis, and his thesis not, as would be the temper of our times,
framed upon the materials.
But let us tum for a moment to the matter. Lessing is discussing the limits of the arts, and he makes of these psychological
limits. The imitations (Lessing accepts the classical definition of
art as imitation) of plastic and pictorial art must be apprehensible
in a single glance·; the powers of the eye, which is the organ by
which we perceive objects in space as unitary objects, themselves
set the bounds for unity in'spatial art; and these bounds are best,
described as the limits of what can be embraced in a moment of
clear seeing, Spatial art is, then, momentary art. The moment
is indeed the very soul of the art, and its choice the crux of
inspiration. It must not be a transitory, a temporal, an active
moment; rather it must be a moment of pause, a suggestive, or,
as Lessing calls it, a "fruitful" moment,-one in which physical
action has ceased, but, as it were, in a suspense which indefinitely
challenges and intensifies imaginative activity. One of Lessing's
surest passages characterises this moment:
"That alone is the fruitful moment which gives the imagination free play.
The more we see the more must we be able to add in~hought, and the more we
add in thought just so much more must we feel that we see. In the whole
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course of a passion there is no moment which has less of this advantage than
has its highest stage. Beyond that there is nothing, and to reveal the utmost
to the eve is to bind the wings of phantasy and to necessitate that, since it
cannot pass beyond the sensible impression, it should busy itself with weaker
images for which the visible fulness of the expression serves as a limitation. I t

Lessing illustrates this fruitful m(i)ment by the Laocoon
group. The artists have seized upon the instant before struggle
has passed into surrender: Laocoon's mps are open, but the
despairing shriek is not yet uttered. And he illustrates again
from the art of Tinomachus: Ajax is depicted in dejection, contemplating self-destruction in the moment after yielding to his
berserk passion, he is not shown in the midst of his rage; Medea
is shown before the murder of her children, torn between motherlove and jealousy, the only moment which our sympathies will
endure.
But, 'says Lessing, poetry is not confined to such restricted
moments; poetry can legitimately depict the whole suffering
of Laocoon, the whole passion of Ajax or ~~dea. Indeed, poetry
must not concentrate upon the single momen,t if it .is to produc~
its own proper effect. Its business isnot·to compete with painting, but to imitate that of which the painter's art 'is incapable;
and that is action, moving events,' temporal reality. Objeqts
contiguous or with parts contiguous, are bodies, the visible
peculiarities of which are the theme of plastic and pictorial art;
objects sequent or with parts sequent are actions, and these are
the peculiar objects of poetic art.
.
Here we have, in its a priori simplicity, Lessing's Grundbegriff;
and it is not without significance, touching such modes of metaphysic, that the law is no sooner laid down tha~ it is modified. '
For all objects are both contiguous in space and sequent in time;
each moment is an enchained appearance, the effect of its predecessor, the cause of its successor. Hence painting can in fact
represent action, "aber nur andeulungsweise durch Korper, "-but
only suggestively through objects; while poetry, no Jess, may
depict bodies, aber nur andeutungsweise durch Handlungen, "
-but only suggestively through aGtions. Thus Raphael, in his
treatment of draperies, shows thE; last preceding movement of the
limb; Homer, on occasion, uses three and even four pictorial
adjectives. The rule of practice is that the two linked moments
which the painter is permitted must be
near in time that we
see them as one without shock, while.the successive images of the
II
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poet must be presented in words so interlinked that we seem to
hear them as one.
Alas for metaphysics and the high a priori road! The clear- Icut boundaries between the arts are no sooner envisaged than
they shimmer and fuse and fluctuate away. For the limits which
Lessing would impose are not outer, but inner; not in the nature
of the matters of art, but in the power of the artist's imagination.
If your artist has the compelling imagination of a Michelangelo;
we can see without shock, in one graphic presentation, moments
of time so far apart as birth and death, Creation and the Day of
Judgment, while the scenic power of words is so chief an
ornament of literature that we can hardly conceive of great
poetic imagination apart from its exercise. Indeed, Lessing
erases his own demarcation when he maintains that the poet
"will make the ideas, which he arouses in us, so living that we
seem to feel the true sensible impression of the objects themselves, and in this moment of illusion cease to be conscious of his
words which are but the means that he employs to this end."
If the ultimate effect of art is a moment of illusion, the agency by
which this illusion is produced should be a matter of indifference.
The truth is that the moment of physical contemplation
accompanied by imaginative zeal, which is for Lessing the
proper effect of the painter's art, and the moment of vivid
imagery accompanied by oblivescence of the words, which is for
him the life of poetry, these two moments are one and the same;
they are occasioned by diverse agents, but they are like experiences, ~nd it is impossible to determine from the experience
what the agent ought to b&.o In words which cannot be bettered,
Herder put the central truth: "If action be the proper subject
of poetic art, yet ca~ this subject never be determined through
the dry concept of successiqn; force is the midpoint of its sphere.
And this for£e is th~ force which cleaves to the inwardness of
words; it is the magic which, through phantasy and memory,
works upon the soul; it is the being of poesy."
If we pause to ask ourselves why, with all its apparent
strength, Lessing's argument analyses so weakly, the answer will
be found to turn upon two deficiencies.
The first of these is of a material nature. Lessing's outlook
upon art is woefully limited. With all his erudition-and no
man can speak of it without respe~t-he seems to have no balanced experience of literature. For him poetry is dramatic
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poetry; it is the poetry of action, and that action human action.
Here Lessing is at one with the ancients; here lies his classicism.
But surely it is a defect for a modern critic to overlook, even if he
be not drawn to, that body of lyric and devotional expression
which makes so great part of what the world counts its poetic
riches. Similarly, on the side of art, Lessing seems to see in the
painter only a possible illustrator,-not of poetry, but of ideas;
his contention is that poetry cannot be pictorially illustrated,
although there are ideas which can be depicted. To a degree this
contention is justified, but to make it the foundation of a philosophy of art implies small acquaintance with the aims and themes
of the painter. In brief, Lessing takes human forms and human
conduct, the scenes and actions which make life, and he shows
how in dramatic portrayal spectacle and book supplement
one another; what he gives is admirable as a guide to truth
in the theatre, but it is a slight survey of the whole field of
art.
The second deficiency in Lessing is one of psychology. I
know that "psychology" is nowadays a term to conjure with,
and that its charge of knowledge is overblown with bosh and
bluster; but the charge of knowledge is, after all, genuine; and
if the critics insist upon being psychological it is but in nature
that the psychologist retort upon them. In the case of Lessing
his ignorance is quite pardonable in the man but a heavy burden
upon his theories. For in the first place the whole assumption of
the momentariness of our visual perceptions of objects, as unities
or entireties, is a false assumption; yet he makes it the support
of his theory of painting and sculpture. And in the second place
the notions upon which he frames his theory of poetry-notions
of the laboriousness of visual imagination and of its inability to
compose unities competing with those of sense,-these notions
must strike with astonishment many of his fellow-men whose
experiences are quite the reverse. The truth appears to be that
Lessing was what is technically known as a motile, or movementminded man, one who thinks in terms of action rather than of
sense: "In general," he says, "we can remember movements
more easily and in a livelier manner than forms or colours, "-a
statement which may very likely have been true of himself but is
certainly not true of many another. It is obvious that no man
can safely erect a theory of art upon his own idiosyncracies, and
Lessing himself is never wiser than in saying, " Nichts ist betrug- ~
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licher als allgemeine Gesetze fur. unsere Empfindungen "-" Nothing is more deceptive than general rules for our sensibilities."
II

Professor Irving Babbitt entitles his essay The New Laokoon
as an indication of his intention, with an added century and a
half of literary history in perspective, once again to take up the
discussion of the boundaries of the arts. The essay divides into
two parts: in the first of these, entitled "The Pseudo-Classic'
Confusion of the Arts," he analyses the conditions and theories
which led up to Lessing's criticism, whose value and shortcomings he appraises; in the second part, entitled "The Romantic
Confusion of the Arts," he resumes the developments of the
nineteenth century and attacks the errors into which he deems
our time to have fallen.
The argument of the first part is to the effect that the" classicism" of post-Renaissance times is essentially a false classicism.
It confuses the arts externally and formally,-a confusion due,
in large part, to its mistaken understanding of the Greek.conception of "imitation" as the first definition of art: this doctrine of
imitation was regarded as throwing the whole stress of resthetic
creation upon the element of reproduction, either a formal copying of classic models or a no less formal symbolism of la belle
nature; that is, of nature regarded as a gracious theme for the
display of artistic tact and taste. The result is obvious and
calculated fiction rather than true imaginative illusion-a chimrera-like consumption of "second intentions" rather than a
vital interpretation of the idea in nature. It was this formalism,
based on an external and mechanical conception of imitation,
which begot the pictorial poetry and poeticised painting attacked
by Lessing. Lessing "is as willing as any critic of the Renaissance to grant that poetry is a painting and an imitation," but
"he is not willing to take the next step, and establish a formal
resemblance between words and figures of speech in poetry and
colours in painting." Lessing has done little more, adds Professor Babbitt, than develop the aphorism of La Fontaine:
, , Words and colours are not alike, nor are eyes ears"; his discussion is really confined to the realm of sense-organ and stimuIus, the realm of experience remains unanalysed.
And it is precisely in the realm of experience, in an inward
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and psychical sense, that Romanticism creates its confusions.
In place of neo-classic "imitation, " it exalts" spontaneity"; in
place of a mind which is a blank tablet for outer impressions, it
offers a soul iti.lmured in its "tower of ivory"; in place of a chimrera feeding on "second intentions," it gives us a monstrous
inner assimilation of "first intentions. " "Back to Nature" is
its cry, but the nature to which it would return is unconfined
and lawless, animistic rather than humanistic, with "higher" and
"lower" inextricably interfused. It is a sort of post-Kantian
" absorption" and "transmutation" in which things and ideas,
appearances and realities, disappear in an absolute blend, which
merits its name of "absolute" only because it is indescribable.
Word-painting, programme music, works in which sounds are
meant to be seen and colours to be heard, all these are symptomatic confusions: "as a man thus melts into nature," says Mr.
Babbitt, "his vocabulary melts into nature with him and takes
on all its variegated hues."
This extraordinary development our critic finds to be but
the outward expression of a psychic mutation which has altered
our faculties. He says:
" The inward eye of which WordsV{orth speaks was comparatively dormant
in men before the last century; since" then it has been so developed as to become a sort of new sense that brings he objects of outer nature into contact
with the soul through the medium imaginative illusion, refining them in the
process and attuning them
h
emotion. This new sense is in itself
very with which it is associated has its
delightful and legitimate, and tli
own uses. The romantic error has been to make of this revery the serious substance of life instead of its occasional solace; to set up the things that are
below the reason as a substitute for those that are above; in short, to tum the
nature cult into a religion."

In a further passage the diagnosis is expanded:
" If all the arts are thus restless and impressionistic, the reason is not far to
seek: it is because the people who practise these arts and for whom they are
practised are themselves living in an impressionistic flutter. If the arts lack
dignity, centrality, repose, it is because the men of the present have no centre,
no sense of anything fixed or permanent either within or without themselves,
that they may oppose to the flux of phenomena and the torrent of impressions.
In a word, if confusion has crept into the arts, it is merely a special aspect of a
more general malady, of that excess of sentimental and scientific naturalism from which, if my diagnosis is correct, the occidental world is now
suffering. "
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It is obvious from these passages that the author of The New
Laokoon is, like his predecessor, a classicist in the sense that his
feeling for art is merged in his feeling for human conduct: that
moral and cesthetic problems are identical. In the concluding
chapters of the book this classicism comes to explicit expression.
Neo-Classicism and Romanticism, he argues, stands each for a
half-truth: the need of form and the need of matter. But in
divorcing these complementary needs, each movement has fallen
into error: formalism, the result of an indolence of the imagination, is the error of the false classicists; "eleutheromania "-" an
undefined liberty and an unselective sympathy, "-the result
of an indolence of the reason, is the sin of the romanticists. But
there is a happy mean: the humanistic law of concentration and
selection, of a will intent upon truth. Real freedom is that of a
spirit which knows and owns its limitations; the need of the hour
is form, in the Aristotelian sense, which will permit sanity and
encourage humane feeling in the midst of the confusions of sense
and spirit which Romanticism has engendered. "If art is to have
humane purpose . . . intuitions of sense must come under the
control of the higher intuitions." Or, as he elsewhere says,
"What we have in the great artists is the intellectualising of
sensations, and not . . . the sensualising of the intellect."
Finally: "The Greeks at their best had humane standards and
held them flexibly. They thu~ effected in some degree that
mediation between the One and the Many that is the highest
wisdom of life. "

III

In our estimate of Lessing we criticised his defective psychology. To a degree this was an incidental criticism; for
Lessing's main contention is not a subtle one; and since his
analysis turns upon the nature of the cesthetic stimulus rather
than the cesthetic experience, his defects, in the matter of psychology, limit the application rather than the essential truth of
his theories. But the case is obviously different with the more
recent critic. Professor Babbitt transfers the discussion bodily
to a psychical realm; the romantic confusion of the arts is, he
tells us, an inner and experiential confusion; it is due to un focal
thinking and feeling, not to confounded sight and sound. Very
clearly, the value of criticism from this point of view must
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depend upon its psychological truth: whether intentionally or not
the critic has diverted his profession from an analysis of matters
to an analysis of mind; he has transformed criticism into psychology, and it is reasonable that his thought should be met
on his own grounds.
I may illustrate the psychological turn by certain current
antitheses: there is "inner" and "outer," intellect and sense,
feeling and will, imagination and reason; and if we will apply
th/'ie terms according to the formula, we shall find that the
volitional, intellectual, and reasonable is the proper definition of
what is classical and humane and in some precious meaning
"higher, " while the emotional, sensible, and imaginative defines
w hat is roman tic and naturalistic and axiomatically "lower" in
our mortal experience. When the matter is put in this bald form,
one begins to suspect that our modern mode is not wholly redeemed from the fallacious seductiveness of Schematismus! At
the least, we are on our guard against that illusion of order which
is so often introduced into complex subjects by the deft arrangemen t of categories .
." If there is, as I suspect, an error underlying this neat itemising
of resthetic experience, it is yet an error peculiar to no one critic;
and before endeavouring to lay it open, we may pause to consider
other instances. Professor Babbitt (accepting his own definitions) is a stout classicist, while Professor Fairchild discusses The
Making of Poetry from a point of view which can be only that of
the unsubdued romantic. For him poetry is indefinable; it
"begins and ends in feeling" ; whatever is to be said about it must
be said from an external, from a circumferential point of view.
However, since this outer attitude permits his book to analyse
the elements, creation, value, and even the "real nature" of
poetry, it cannot be supposed that we have lost much in losing
the" definability" of the poet's art. To begin with, the material
of poetry is mental images; the language which stimulates these
is merely an outer and servile circumstance. But these images
must be more than replications of nature if we are to have poetry;
they must be "personalisations "-that is, absorptions of nature
by the poet's personality. "Everywhere there is a going out of
my own nature," writes our critic; "I identify myself with all
that exists in thought, action, or person, not my own. Everywhere I carryon a process of self-projection; I put myself into
the life and action of people and of things; I humanise them. "

"LAOKOON" AND THE PRIOR QUESTION

347

Corollary to this is the notion that form, verse-form, is purely
adventitious: "versifying," we are told, "finds its most satisfactory explanation, not through consideration of its external
form, but in terms of its inner effects." This analysis leads up to
the doctrine that the nature of poetry is "self-realisation,"poetry is "a form of pleasurable and unified self-realisation"
which "must represent either something new that is valued, or,
if not something new, something known and wished for, but not
consistently attained in feeling, thought, or action. "
It would be difficult to find a more unadulterated statement
of the "romantic" point of view than is this of Professor Fairchild's,-which, it is but fair to add, he supports with a liberal
analysis of materials drawn chiefly from sources which are confessedly of the romantic movement. We can imagine that
Professor Babbitt might feel nervous at Professor Fairchild's preemption of the term" humanism" to designate his philosophy of
art; for" self-projection" and" self-realisation, " in the expansive
and catholic sense employed by the latter, is as far as can be from
that" concentration of the will" which is the former's definition
of humanism. But after all can an impartial arbiter deny the
right of either conception? "Concentration of the will" is a
reasonable interpretation of [J.'1)oh a"(Clv, but "self-projection"
may no less reasonably be inferred from" esse is percipi," and each
of these rests with equal right upon the prior humanistic maxim,
"Know thyself." And it is not without point that the critical
philosophies of our two exponents, though following very different routes, are altogether neighbourly in their conclusions; for
between" that mediation between the One and the Many that is
the highest wisdom of life" for Professor Babbitt, and the
"feeling of unity attained and continuity of experience emphasised" in which Professor Fairchild sees the value of poetry,
the difference is verbal rather than speculative.
As much cannot be said of another book which also must be
classed as the expression of an unsubdued romantic. The very
title of Max Eastman's Enjoyment of Poetry is meant to shunt it
off from all those philosophies of art which centre on will and
reason; in place of these, emotion and the senses are for Dr.
Eastman warp and woof of the poetic fabric. He begins his
discussion with a sharp severation of the poetic from the practical;
people are of two kinds, "some of them are chiefly occupied with
attaining ends, some with receiving experiences"; it is the latter
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who compose the tribe-of poets. Now the distinguishing mark
of the two temperaments is their use of names; the practical man
will select names which familiarise "adjustments," the poetical
will employ epithets which challenge "realisation." "Is the
right name of water wet, or is it H20?" Here we have the
antithesis set: a perfect algebra is the ideal of the practical reason,
while poetry is "the art of calling names."
We are not surprised on being led to infer from this that
Homer and Shakespeare get their lesson from folklore, or that
poetic wisdom is most certain to be found on the lips of babes,
savages, and yokels. "Poetry is of necessity the language both
of children who do not understand the general names of things,
and savages who have not decided upon those names"; and
"poetry is a countryman, and greets every experience by its own
name." Framed from this calibre the essence of poetry is the
monosyllables of thought; it is an art of words, of morsels succulent or bitter, each giving as its delight some special delice or
poignancy-and if my talk seem to savour closely of the cuisine,
it is yet untrue to our critic's conception only in that for him
poetry makes real for us objects of sense which can but verbally
pass our lips. "Millions of so-called' stories' are current among
men, women, and children of which the climax is not humour but
poetry, a vivid filth. " I Plato, we will remember, not even for the
sake of scientific consistency would admit "hair" and ":filth"
into the aristocracy of the Ideas,-and perhaps this is a measure
of the distance we have come unto a time when poetic effulgence
is found even upon offal.
To be sure, ideas have a kind of place in Dr. Eastman's
theory. They are not valued in poetry for their use-which is
their essence-but for what is adventitious to their being; the
poet" loves the idea, as he loves the thing, for its suggestiveness,
its discursiveness, its inapplicabilities." "The realisation of ideas
is a part of the advent:ure of being"; but it is made sufficiently
clear to us that, on the whole, it is much the poorer part. The
1 Our author adds, "This is the dry rot of poetry."
But on his theory,
there is no reason for this judgment except his temperamental dislike of filth.
On the other hand, taking· his own valuation of words for their suggestive
qualities, there is perfect right on the part of anyone who cares vigorously to
deny that" filth" is ever" poetry." The word poetry, as Eastman's description
acknowledges, has won for itself a flavour which distinctly proclaims that
it has something to do with beauty,-a flavour, I may add, upon which
the author often, if unconsciously, relies to persuade assent to his judgments.
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qualities which make the poet are sensitiveness, sympathy, and
self-knowledge; and while each of these qualities is excellent in
itself, it is evident, from the limitation of the catalogue, which
way the wind sets: sensitiveness is the quality of a mind perceptually resilient, sympathy calls for quick-welling emotion, while
self-knowledge is here no Greek thing, but something more surely
the possession of indigenes and sucklings than of sages and kings.
In fact, what is called mind-and in particular, poetic mind"is itself a part of things" as far as these engender experience.
H The poetic impulse is a love of that experience for its own sake.
Poetic creation begins in us when we marry, with such love, the
images of memory to the impressions of sense, and when to this
union we set the seal of a vivid and communicable name we
are poets in the full and divine sense. Weare makers of a
world. "
Here poetry is not, as it is with Professor Fairchild, an outward flowing of the ego, familiarising and personalising a world of
unillumined externalities; rather it is the chaotic precipitate of
mind particles upon the things themselves, or (perhaps more in
the spirit of Dr. Eastman) it is the myriad dew crystallised upon
the world's gardens for the morning's intoxication;-one jewelled
moment it sparkles to the sun's flame, then vanishes forever.
Here is no talk of concentration, but only of dissipation; nothing
to be garnered or gained, but all for profligate spending.
Nor does the will fare better than the reason in the compounding of the poetic experience. To be sure, we are told that
poetry is a manifestation of the "will to live"; but we recognise
this will as the blind and distempered passion for life philosophised by Schopenhauer rather than any guided control of conduct. Life is a reasonless adventure, with surety only in its present
gift, and poetry, whose office it is to catch the momentary glint
of momentary things, obtains its excellence just in "a vivifying of
present experience in an adventurous world." If poetry has no
portion with purpose, naturally it has· none with consecutive
action. It was the accident of Greek form that made Aristotle
regard tragedy as poetry, according to Dr. Eastman; narrative
is not properly poetry at all, but a satisfaction of the appetites
of the will; Shakespeare is the poet of action not because he is a
creator of drama, but because he excels all others in galvanising
thought by images of action: " Look to Shakespeare for the poetry
of verbs." The upshot of it all is that" poetry is a series of
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pictures accompanied by appropriate music, "-which is a flaring
defiance to Lessing and Mr. Babbitt.
By the time we have been taught that poetry is the particoloured babble of infants and primitives, that it is akin to magic
and adventure and Bacchanalian orgy, that even the rhythm,
which seems to give it tautness and form, is but a lethargising
hypnosis, by this time we begin to misdoubt the very possibility
of such a thing as a poem or a poetic work; and, despite the relish
of many palatable phrases and some fair-said truths, in the presence of the obvious fact of literature, we turn from the Enjoyment
of Poetry with the feeling that the most its author has done is to
make a saucy statement of a bad case.

IV
The question which naturally occurs to us sociable human
beings, when we encounter sharp antitheticals contrariwise shaping our conduct and conceptions, is whether there may not be
some comfortable and compromising middle way, friendly to each
extreme. William Allan Neilson's The Essentials of Poetry is a
search for such a via media between "classicism" and "romanticism. " Neilson agrees with the current diagnosis in making
imagination the distinctive mark of romanticism; it is associated
with the "rediscovery of the soul" and the "return to Nature,"
with emotionalism and naturalism, and with that expansiveness
of temperament which drives your romantic to seek his theme
in the far-away and the unfamiliar, in barbarous Outlands or
Medireval Thules: "emotion stimulates imagination and is stimulated by it in tum, and in so far as the free expression of natural
human feeling in a poem is due to imaginative causes, it is to be
reckoned as a romantic character, "-emotion, imagination, free
expression of feeling; it is the familiar formula. Classicism, on
the other hand, is intimately dependent upon reason: "the predominance of the rational and formal element in art results
in the tendency known as classicism. " Predominance of reason
necessarily means an especial concern with the peculiar instruments of reasoning, namely, abstract ideas. But this involves,
in the first place, loss of imaginative vividness and emotional
stress, for both imagination and emotion are essentially concrete,
not abstract; and in the second place, it involves the everpresent endangering of that very character for which vividness
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is sacrificed, and that is truth; for while truth is necessarily
expressed in general terms, generality is by nature formal; and
when we have to do with matters so capriciously elevated from
the phenomenal world as are resthetic matters, then, more than
elsewhere, is formality in danger of resolving into formalism.
Classicism stresses form; but its peril is lest in our passion for
formal perfection we lose our sense for fact. So Aristotle caustically says of the Pythagoreans: H All the properties of numbers
and scales which they could show to agree with the attributes and
parts and the whole arrangement of the heavens, they collected
and fitted into their scheme; and if there was a gap anywhere,
they readily made additions so as to make their whole theory
coherent. "
It is just for the avoidance of like emptinesses that the
"sense of fact" which we find in realism has come to be so
valued a quality, says Professor Neilson. The sense of fact is
the salt substance of literature, "lending steadiness to imagination and supplying material to reason," though "resulting, when
it exists in isolation or excess, in its own characteristic kind of
failure." The case is that imagination, reason, and the sense of
fact must all be maintained in a happy proportionality if we
are to have creations of the first value, and the quality which
can so maintain them he finds in "intensity." The situation is
presented in a quaint allegory:
"Up the sides of Parnassus labour the would-be poets coming by the three
main roads of imagination, reason,' and the sense of fact. Those who have
arrived at the top are camped on that side of the plateau next the road by
which they ascended, and the camps are called by the names Romantic,
Classic, and Realistic. There are other roads and other camps, but so far we
have concerned ourselves with only these three. The great leaders, however,
are to be found, not in the heart of anyone of these camps, but, in proportion
to their greatness, towards the middle of the plateau. The farther from this
. great centre, the more partisan they become, and down the slopes on each side
and out on the plains of prose one sees little figures waving their party banners
and shouting their party cries, far from the summit of victory at whose centre
is a great peace."

The quality of "intensity" is, as it were, the radiance which
suffuses thi(Parnassian height. If we wish for a more definite
description; "It is what the modern critic means-when he
means anything-by temperament. It is often called merely
emotion, or feeling, or passion, "-though it is more than is
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conveyed by anyone of these terms, being a kind of alembic
quality whose one office is to redeem all other qUalities from
dross.
With these four qualities the centre of Professor Neilson's
critical edifice is completed. They constitute a statement of
the resthetic core of literary art. There are other qualities,
-for example, he treats sentiment and humour; but these have
to do with the ethical side of art, resthetics as affected by ethics,
rather than with its untouched essence: sentiment builds up
and humour criticises ideals of conduct rather than patterns of
beauty, and hence these qualities are incidental in criticism.
Beyond question, we have here an attractive platting of the
"middle way." Inevitably we ask, is it satisfying? is it an
adequate and workable philosophy of criticism? In order to
answer such questions, we must, I think, resume our consideration of the psychological theory which, with curious uniformity,
underlies all these diverse critical excursions.

v
Professor Neilson, when he is seeking a text for his treatise,
chooses a passage from Bacon's Great Instauration, to wit: "The
best division of human leaming is that derived from the three
faculties of the rational soul, which is the seat of learning. History has reference to the Memory, poesy to the Imagination, and
philosophy to the Reason." In the light of this passage it is
easy to see upon what support rests Professor Neilson's division
of realistic, romantic, and classic; for the sense of fact, imagination, and reason in poetry are but the manifestations of the three
faculties set in relief by Bacon's partition.
Perhaps the most signal effect of Bacon's work has been the
sense of form, and the form of the sense of form, which it has
imposed upon modern critical thinking. Bacon developed, with
great elaboration, his notion of the relation of the fields of leaming to the faculties of the rational soul; and in that veritable
incarnation of the spirit of the Enlightenment, L'Encyclopedie
. . . ou Dictionnaire raisonne des Sciences, des Arts et des Metiers,
as its title continues, . . . as explained by d' Alembert in the
Discours preliminaire, Bacon's arrangement is made the model
for the encyclopredic organisation of all human knowledge. The
influence of this work upon later thought is wellnigh universal;
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and certainly, in all branches of criticism, where perspective is
essential to sound conclusions, the spirit of the Encyclopcedia is
autocratic.
Now it is quite obvious that Bacon's division, and the point
of view which it has engendered, is a psychological one. Is the
psychology true and sufficient? This is our inevitable question;
and if the achievements of psychological science in modern
times are in any degree to be taken seriously, it has only to be
asked to be answered in the negative. For the psychologist of
to-day, though he rna y still use the notion of faculties in his
provisional analyses, is perfectly aware of their fictive nature.
For him the human mind is not a thing to be dissected, part from
part, the parts duly prepared and labelled, and then properly
exhibited in museum array; rather, he conceives it as a living
reality, whose action is always one and simple though its description may be many and complex; it is not a composite structure of faculties, nor yet of states; it is growing and adaptive
and unifying, as are all forms of life, and its essence is its operation. As it is with the mind, so is it with experience as a whole,
and especially with those products of experience by which we
judge what is essential humanity.
Now if we turn from the psychologist to the critic, what
do we find? In the first place, an ostensible psychologising of his
subject-matters, a passage from the "outer" to the "inner,"
from the stimulus to the experience; and in the second place, no
accompanying understanding of psychological problems. I The
psychology of Bacon and the Medirevalists is still all-sufficient
for the commentators upon art; they still discourse in terms of
wits and faculties quite oblivious of the changed intentions which
scientific progress has brought to these terms; and they fail
utterly to apply, and apparently to grasp, the conception of mind
and its creations, which, I venture to affirm, is not only the
modem, but also the conception of the best of the Greeks, for it
iSiPlato who tells us that "being is power," and Aristotle who
says that actuality is work, action, " and who defines the soul as
actuality. :
/I

I Dr. Eastman does recognise the more modem view, but he makes no
essential use of it. "Probably any theory which regards the laboratory
analysis of our experience into emotion, sensation, affection, image, idea, and
so forth, as a final truth, will itself prove but temporary. We are safer when
we talk of experience as a whole."
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Plutarch, in one of his catechetical paragraphs, asks how
many are the senses, andi~responds that according to the Stoic
school there are five-sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch,-but
that Aristotle adds to these a "common sense" whose business
it is to perceive the compounded forms given us by the representations of the special senses, and likewise to reveal those developments in nature which appear in our perceptions of change.
This sixth sense exercises an hegemony over all the others,
from the simple fact that it alone deals with that actuality
of action which is the essential being at once of outer nature and of the soul-a fair and pragmatic reason, by the way,
why it should be the lineal source of our own prized "common
sense."
Now the critics seem all to cleave to the decadent Stoic
psychology. When they are dealing with the physical senses
only, as in the case of Lessing, their conclusion may be, as Lessing's is, a sound if narrow theory. But when they would pass
from this external and safe province to the more central facts of
resthetic experience, their dangers are multiplied and, we fear,
their weaknesses made evident. In the cases resumed we have
illustration. Mr. Babbitt's theory rests upon antitheses of sense
and intellect, emotion and will, which govern his conceptions and
determine his formulre,-as if there could be intellect devoid of
. sense, or will apart from feeling, or either pair in independence of
the other. Mr. Neilson has memory, imagination, and reason in
Baconian compartments of the mind, ready to serve as the proper
keys to resthetic intelligibility. Mr. Fairchild, after postulating
an indefinable thing-in-itself called feeling, as the essence of
poetry, proceeds to divide a material of phantasma from a combining-form of poetic intelligence; and so deems that he has
marked out for us some advance in some direction worth pursuing. Finally, Mr. Eastman would compound poetry of senseperception, emotion, and memory, leaving will and intellect to be
the concern of the man of affairs. The pertinent question is,
to what does all such criticism lead? The classifications which
it engenders are not true; it cannot define the proper themes or
modes of resthetic creation; and it can hardly be expected to give
reliable guidance to our tastes. The total impression which it
conveys, after one has taken time for sober analysis of its meaning, is of the substitution of eloquent but empty" abracadabras"
for the familiar term "spade"; and the lesson it conveys is, if
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anything, the reiteration of Lessing's wise caution: "Nichts ist
betruglicher als algemeine Gesetze fur unsere Empfindungen."

VI
But though we condemn the psychology of the critics, as
antiquated and inadequate, there is another point of yiew, which
is, indeed, a prior point of view, fr.pm which-their conclusions
may be judged. The prior view is -the philosophical, and it raises
a question which may reasonably be regarded as essentially
precedent to such psychological discussion of the boundaries
of the arts as is found in the Laokoon and similar treatises.
We will take our departure from the current conceptions of
"romantic" and "classic," giving to these terms as precise an
interpretation as tHeir customarily loose employment will permit. The sharp antithesis of sense and intellect, feeling and will,
imagination and reason, we must reject as inherently false, and
conducive only to hypostatical idols and epithetical combats. We
will thus avoid such absurd prejudgments as that sensible beauty
is necessarily inferior to intellectual because sense is in some
mystical meaning" lower" and intellect" higher" ; or that unions
of sense and intellect which we demand in poetry, under the
forms of imagination and reason, are impure and bastard when
they occur in musical art; or that emotion is a thing that can
be operated upon and cured by will, rather than an intrinsic
phase of volitional experience. These are assumptions which
spoil our tempers without advancing our wisdom; and since they
are grounded in unreality we will pass them by, and we will tum
to inquire what legitimate philosophical meanings underlie our
terms.
As I see it, the metaphysical burden conveyed by "romantic
versus classic" is that of the particular as contrasted with the
general or of the changing as opposed to the changeless. The
two terms denote attitudes toward experience and methods of
presenting impressions derived from nature. Neither method
has any prerogatory claim as the vera causa either of knowledge
or of beauty, and each must prove its own value. Nor is either
justly condemned by pointing out, for example, that the romantic
affection of mind is neither humble nor economical, or that the
classical purchases its clear and distinct definition by confining
itself to superficial ideas, while its immaculate form is only the
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rigor mortis that for a moment preserves the aspect of life from
imminent decay. Such judgments do not condemn until we have
first inquired whether arrogance and wastefulness, superficiality
and mechanical rigidity are sins and are avoidable; and these
questions we cannot answer until we know under what conditions
knowledge and beauty are humanly attainable, and, I may add,
in what sense they are good.
We must resume, in other words, the Greek mode of criticism,
which was an ethical mode, but ethical in the most philosophical
sense. I do not mean that we should parrot the Greeks, priggishly asserting, as some do, that they have once for all uttered
all that can worthily be said. There is rather every reason why
we should avail ourselves of that distinction of moral and resthetic which we see and which they failed to see, so that in place
of )('(xAax!l:,(X6((X we shall discuss )('C%AOY )(.(Xt a,cx66y, seeking to determine their likeness and difference in the total ordination of
experience. And having placed our criticism upon such basis as
this, we shall then surely be able to appraise our activities with
a more certain justice.
This conception of criticism is not "classical" in the current
sense; but it is, I believe, true to the Greek mode. For it is
difficult to imagine any Greek condemning the principle of
evolution as our modern "classicists" condemn it, or yet proposing that separation of man and nature of which we make so
much. Our classicists are too often men made timid by possessions, fearful of venturing the new lest they cease to prize what
they already have; and the romanticist is to them a man gone
mad with arrogant ambitions. It is as if the heavy saurians of
Mesozoic ages were to reproach the first of the winged tribe
because of their aspiration: "Behold us," they would say, "are
we not perfect? our articulate scales, our iridescent armour,
shield and crest and serrate spine,-could aught be more beautiful? And ye-scant-feathered, toothless, beaked,-what seek
ye in the empty air? The stable and occupied earth is the proper
abode of temperate life!" We can imagine what Plato would
say in reply to this, for he utters it in a great passage-the figure
of the winged horses and the charioteer and the period of thrice
ten thousand years of effort to attain to the divine vision, whereof
the memory is such that he who recalls it, forgets his earthly
affairs and is rapt in the divine, while the vulgar deem him mad
and upbraid him, seeing not that he is inspired.
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Nor will our modern classicists, I imagine, derive much
comfort from Plato in their notion that discursive and dichotomising reason is the prime support of intelligence, for it is the
master of dialectic himself who says that when" all philosophers
with one voice assert mind to be king of heaven and earth, in
reality they are but magnifying themselves." The truth is, as
Plato of all men most persistently recognised, there is more than
one form of human experience and more than one form of knowledge. Reason is one such form, and none judges it more highly
than did Plato; but there are other forms that cannot be expressed
in the discourse of reason.
Can they be expressed, and do they deserve expression, in the
discourse of the arts? This is a metaphysical question and it
must be answered by metaphysical considerations. It was Pascal, I believe, who defined metaphysics as "a sophisticated
poetry." A countryman of Pascal's, writing of Greek poetry,
gives the obverse and truer statement: La metaphysigue est
Z'dme de toute poesie. And if metaphysics is the soul of all
poetry, is it not evident that our modern critics must become,
what the great critics of antiquity were, metaphysicians first
and judges of literature afterwards? Nor will any critic so
equipped feel that his humanism is imperilled because our modern
understanding of nature, far more penetrating than that of any
Greek, has vastly extended our conception of human endeavour.
Rather he will feel that this expansion of our mortal prospect is a
challenge to our powers of expression, and judging our modern
art by the greatness of the demands made upon it rather than
by the weakness with which it too often meets these demands,
he will prophetically see its bright future and inspiringly guide
it upon the path of attainment.
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